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THE CONSTITUTION-APROPOS OF CROSSKEY 
WALTON H. HAJdiLTONt 
Judges assume that their predecessors were men 
of sense and reason such as themselves. 
-0LD SIMIAN PROVERB 
I 
I
T IS UNFAIR to say that William Crosskey's volumes on the Constitu-
tion are timely-and not add more. They are timely, in view of the 
crisis of 1953, but they are also, so far as any political system can be 
enduring, timeless. The larger meaning which they carry is as pertinent 
today as to the crisis of 1937-when part of the instant book was presented 
as a paper on "The Language of the Fathers" read before the American 
Historical Association at its commemoration of the !50th year of opera-
tion of our government under the instrument of 1787. And the chapters 
here in review are as applicable in the constitutional crises which have 
been muddled through as they will be valuable in the constitutional crises 
which the passing decades will bring. 
It is inevitable that judges should substitute doctrines of their own for 
those which the Fathers set down in the original document. And such are-
writing of the law-even of the enduring principles of the higher law-is 
as necessary as it is inevitable. For the values which fix the objectives of 
public policy must change as the aspirations of men are broadened "with 
the process of the suns"; and, even as ends endure, they must be newly in-
strumented amid the changing circumstances of a dynamic culture or they 
will be betrayed. With the fact that there is substitution we can have no 
legitimate quarrel. But we may object-vocally, indignantly, rightfully-
at the specific substitute,.at the uncritical way in which it is contrived, at 
the violence with which it is thrust into place, at the severity of its break 
with the past. Here lies the real contribution that Professor Crosskey's 
volumes will make. They do not, they cannot, arrest the development of 
the body of law; but, if they are read and heeded, they will serve to make 
constitutional change a more intelligent, critical, and rational process 
than ever it has been. · 
The doctrines originally written into the Constitution are set down by 
fSouthmayd Professor Emeritus of Law, Yale Law School; member of the Bar of the 
Supreme Court of the United States. 
79 
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Crosskey in a fulness and with a clarity heretofore unknown. The jurist 
who remakes the constitutional clause which he applies, and professes to 
respect, can no longer be excused on the ground that he is quite unaware 
of what he is doing. Upstart doctrines which fall outside the code of the 
higher law as of 1787 or are utterly alien to it are revealed for what they 
are. In these pages there is sounded, not a call to constitutional statics, 
but a warning that those whose task it is to remake the Constitution must 
be aware of what they do. 
It is the genius of the Constitution of the United States that it has never 
remained static long enough to receive definite statement. The Federalist 
Papers, which are a classical gloss rather than an autho.ritative guide upon 
the original text (or at least that part of it written at Philadelphia), attest 
differences in understanding among its three dominant authors-and per-
haps a ghost writer or two-who were in position to speak with authority. 
I say the part written at Philadelphia, for the first ten amendments are 
amendments only in a technical sense. They are in reality an integral part 
of the original document; without their addition the Constitution would 
never have become the law of the land. It required no formal amendments 
to make the Constitution as expounded by John Marshall a body of doc-
trine on which John Jay and Oliver Ellsworth, who had preceded him in 
the office of Chief Justice, could never have passed an examination. In the 
late 1830's Joseph Story accused his newly appointed brethren of sacrilege 
to the memory of the sainted Marshall for the liberties in interpretation 
which they had taken. In point of fact, Story himself was not quite clear 
as to the line of division in the Constitution between the original and the 
pronouncements of the eminent Chief Justice. By the middle '50's, the 
Supreme Court was serving up raw material to the great "constitutional 
lawyers" who sat in the United States Senate; and Webster, Calhoun and 
his mouthpiece Hayne, and others had come to regard the Constitution 
itself as existing largely for didactical purposes. The infusion of country 
lawyers into the Supreme Court by Lincoln brought its own change in 
direction. By the turn into the twentieth century belief in laissez faire had 
become a cardinal article of constitutional faith; in the parchment which 
was a legacy from the late eighteenth century there was clearly to be read 
a prohibition against intrusion by the state into the province of the free 
and open market recognized as sovereign in all matters economic. By the 
middle 1930's, through a recently acquired capacity to read between the 
lines, the Supreme Court had been endowed by the Constitution with a 
veto power over the Congress in all matters involving public policy. But 
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as the Court was reconstituted by F.D.R. much that had been clearly 
visible began to fade, even if not entirely to disappear, and canons of in-
terpretation which some critics have mistaken for a cult of irresponsibility 
have come into the ascendancy. In the fact of change there is nothing 
startling or even unexpected. The document of 1787 could not have be-
come and remained "the living constitution" unless it had the capacity to 
adapt itself, as one of our greatest jurists once put it, "to the infiilite 
variety of the changed circumstances of life." Nor can I read the pages of 
these volumes without finding in the Constitution itself an invitation to 
adaptation and reinterpretation. 
Such an invitation-even if it is specifically withheld-is inherent in the 
very nature of a political instrument which is regarded as fundamental. 
The laws of the Medes and Persians are reputed to have been unchanging, 
but scholars report that even the scanty evidence on application which 
has come down to us refutes the conclusion. The Ten Commandments 
may have remained intact from the time of Moses down to the present 
day. But the honor which children were at the time of their origin expected 
to pay to parents would seem outrageous to us today. And the adultery 
there forbidden by divine command is subject to civil definition. Long 
after the Law-Giver had gone to rest on Nebo's lonely mountain the co-
habitation of a man mighty in the land with many women did not fall 
within the prohibition; and today, as our multiplex of state codes go, a 
man who in one state is an adulterer in another may be a bigamist or even 
a celibate. The Twelve Tables, which were doubtless a codification of es-
tablished usage, preserved their literal integrity from the Puritan days of 
early Rome well down into the times of urbane and worldly Caesars. Yet 
the gloss of judicial decision set down in the palmy days of the Empire has 
lost the severities which were its mark when the pater familias was lord 
and master. The Magna Carta was for long only one of a number of char-
ters in which the rights of privilege were made secure against the royal 
prerogatives. So little did it signify to lawyers or to the people that it did 
not even occur to Shakespeare to mention it in his history of King John. 
But the coming of the Stuarts brought to the archaic lines of a forgotten 
document a meaning which had never been there. The words on parch-
ment were the least among the elements which went into a political crea-
tion of the eighteenth century. So it has been with the Bill of Rights. It is 
quite certain that, even if he read it, George III did not understand the 
grand recitation of the unlawful acts of the English King which makes up 
the middle section of our Declaration of Independence. It is a historical 
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fact that George III and Thomas Jefferson later did meet face to face. 
The details of the occasion are lost, but the only safe guess is that they 
found nothing to say to each other. 
It is a little presumptuous for one generation, through a Constitution, 
to impose its will upon posterity. Posterity has its own problems; and to 
deal with them adequately it needs freedom of action, unhampered by the 
dead hand of the past. Restraints can be passed along the decades only 
by a generation persuaded that the wisdom it has acquired will somehow 
be denied to those who come after. But the dominion of the dead over the 
quick is too loosely held to invite lament. The Fathers may issue mandate 
after mandate to their successors; but they lack capacity to compel obedi-
ence unless they are understood and understanding· is blocked by the 
stubborn fact that verbal currency passes uncertainly between the gen-
erations. For this uncertainty there are many causes. As instruments of 
communication, words are deceptive things. No rule of diction can assign 
to a word such as power or process, contract or obligation, a province of its 
own and fence it within boundaries which it is forbidden to transgress. As 
it is set down, in writing or in print, it takes its meaning from its context 
which endows it with color and with.implications that, standing alone, it 
could never possess. As it goes ringing down the years on the tongues of 
a myriad of people it may take in new territory ·as little by little it sur-
renders a part of its ancient domain. The playwright of the Old Globe 
knew what he meant when he used the word "discovery" in connection 
with the raising of the curtain. Our grandfathers used the word "notori-
ous" in the colorless sense of being well known; it is to us today a highly 
colored word, employed in forgetfulness of its etymology and suggestive 
of the scandal sheet. The word "humour" has lost far more than the "u" 
as it has come down from Ben Jonson to Maxwell Anderson. 
All of this is far too obvious to become a guiding principle of constitu.-
tionallaw. The easy way is for the advocate, the essayist, and even the 
judge, to say, "When the Fathers wrote the Constitution they meant by 
any word just what I mean by it, or what I want it to mean." A great 
contribution of Crosskey's volumes is a return to simplicity; a recognition 
that the Fathers were not "men of sense and reason such as ourselv.es"; 
that they were differently circumstanced, were confronted by other and 
distinct problems, and breathed another and a different intellectual at-
mosphere. Their language is the more deceptive because of its superficial 
resemblance to our own. But even in little matters of speech distinctions 
in usage betoken differences in thought. Crosskey, for example, makes 
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much of the use of plural verbs with what appear to us to be single sub-
jects, e.g., "Virginia feel" or "Pennsylvania think." The nouns, of course, 
are collective in character. The groups are considered as still too diffuse to 
be dealt with as clearcut entities. As a result, each of the several states is 
primarily thought of rather as an aggregate of people---;-with all the diver-
sity which such an aggregate must possess-than as an organized and 
homogenous political community. It appears, too, that "the people," to 
whom were left the rights not specifically prohibited to the state govern-
ments nor vested exclusively in the federal government, was not to the 
Fathers a homogenous "body politic" but Tather an aggregate of all sorts 
and conditions of mankind. Verb and noun in their disparity attest the 
lack of an overruling notion of uniformity in the words of the Fathers. 
In like manner, Crosskey sets out to draw back through all the muta-
tions which a century and two-thirds have brought to discover exactly 
what the Fathers meant when they used the word "commerce." It is not 
a word indigenous to economic or business speech. It came into the lan-
guage as a verbal symbol for contact, intercourse, communication, the 
co-mingling together in organized society. Its contours extended far be-
yond the market place and it transcended activities which had to do with 
the buying and selling of commodities or even their production for ex-
change. In a pecuniary sense, the commerce of a number of the several 
states constituted the thinnest sort of a stream. The Fathers would never 
have thought of the scanty stream of vendibles headed for market as the 
commerce of their several states. The power "to regulate commerce," 
Crosskey shows, was a power to govern "all gainful activity" among the 
people of the states. The interpretation in these volumes is in strict accord 
with the original Randolph resolution which came into its definitive state-
ment in the "commerce clause" of Section 8 of Article I. The resolution 
proposed to endow the Congress with power to act in all matters which lie 
beyond "the competence of the several states." As such, it is as clearcut 
as it is comprehensive in its mandate; and it is unfortunate that afunction-
al definition of legislative power was superseded by a definition set down 
as an area of regulation. It is more unfortunate that, as the word "com-
merce" lost a large part of the human activities for which it once stood the 
legislative power delegated by "the people" came to be restricted. It is 
pectiliar that the drift of a word from its ancient meaning should have 
narrowed the legitimate province of federal regulation. The careful mark-
ing of the ancient desmaine is typical of the work in restoration in consti-
tutional law which Crosskey has so imaginatively and painstakingly ac-
complished. 
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II 
If a decade ago I had been asked whether the United States has a writ-
ten or an unwritten Constitution I would have replied, "I do not know." 
If the same query _were put to me today the reply would be, "There is 
no such question." For, after delving into the two Crosskey volumes, as 
many questions dance on the point of a pen as ever angels staged a ballet 
on the point of a needle. 
A search for its authors will attest the nature of the Constitution. The 
hunt begins, of course, at Philadelphia in 1787 where the Founding 
Fathers "in Convention asselnbled." In one way or another all who were 
present had a share in paternity. There was, first of all, James Madison, 
who by wide reading and alert study had for some time tried to anticipate 
and contrive answers to the problems which such a convention would pose. 
He was in particular concerned to subdue the violence of the struggle be-
tween the interests which make up the commonwealth into questions 
which could be stated and resolved within the decorum of orderly par-
liamentary procedure. He was also bothered by the historical fact that 
almost without exception the successful republics of the past had been 
city states and he was intent upon creating a system where that principle 
could be applied on a continental scale. There was Gouverneur Morris, the 
Philadelphia lawyer, who emerges in Crosskey's work as one of the chief 
architects of the document. There was Edmund Randolph, head of the 
Virginia delegation, who was resolved that matters which lay beyond the 
competence of the several states, such as the rising commerce of the new 
republic, should be saved from the current anarchy. There was George 
Mason who, among as able a group of country squires as was ever as-
sembled, somehow knowingly or unknowingly brought a touch of delno-
cratic thought into the deliberations. There was James Wilson, who during 
the Revolution had from experience fortified his scepticism of the mercan-
tile system -an article of faith or of disbelief which he had first learned as 
a student from Professor Adam Smith himself. There was Alexander Ham-
ilton, closest of all to the presiding officer, George Washington, who held 
in high esteem a government by the noblest, the richest, and the best and 
who was sure that he could adapt its principles to the new great common-
wealth which -if only his fellow delegates would be wise-he saw ahead. 
There was the loquacious Charles Pinckney who on occasion came across 
with an idea, indigenous or borrowed: There were the score or more of 
delegates who, so far as the records attest, made only the constructive 
contribution of silence to the proceedings and the affixing of their names 
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to the emergent document. And there were, :finally, the handful of human 
beings, such as Gates and Lansing, who, :finding the whole affair distaste-
ful, left the hall in disgust or refused to sign the parchment and thus 
sought to insure to themselves immunity from immortality. 
But even so short a recitation carries the search for authorship afield. 
The importance of the event at Philadelphia does not obscure the con-
tinuity of constitutional history. This creation -this superb political crea-
tion-was contrived from the best of the stuff at hand. Madison was no 
researcher, who garnered what to him seemed valuable and piled up facts, 
like bricks, into an imposing edifice. Instead, he began with insistent ques-
tions, foraged far and wide for exactly what he required, and beat his raw 
materials into an organic whole. In the shaping of the Constitution of 
1787, ideas, usages, diction from many sources lose their marks of indi-
vidual identity, yet survive in the fabric which is woven. Take away the 
past-and the Fathers would have lacked the materials with which they 
built. Take away the Fathers-and the material would have gone into 
another sort of edifice or would have remained inert. Who, then, can say 
that men of old, whose words helped to shape the kind of government which 
befits free men, were not as truly as Franklin, Madison, and \Vilson to be 
numbered among the Fathers of the Constitution? An intellectual venture 
which is as alluring as it is unconceivable is to draw up a list of the men 
whose influence has been sufficient, directly or indirectly, to entitle them 
to be numbered among the Fathers of the Constitution. 
Through a single event in time the whole course of history may flow. 
In Article II the office of the Chief Executive is set down in almost obvious 
words. Yet back of the simple statement lie some centuries of history with 
living events shaped by a host of unlike actors. For the Presidency is the 
Monarch of old, whose absolute prerogative has been subdued by law and 
whose divine right has been turned into a series of specific and limited 
powers. The words and deeds by which the appointed of the Lord became 
the servant of the electorate occurred for the most part long before the hot 
summer of 1787 set in and in places far removed from the City of Brother-
ly Love. A circumlocutions method of selection -which within t".Vo dec-
ades had to be made over-was the only real innovation. The legislative 
branch likewise bears the marks of time and of a changing culture. The 
idea of a bicameral system was too firmly implanted by tradition and un-
critical acceptance to be given up, even if only historical accident had 
brought it into being and whatever rationale it had once possessed was 
alien to its American use. There had come to be, without anyone intend-
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ing it, two houses because very early the Lords Spiritual and the Lords 
Temporal had recognized their common interests in an Act of Union and 
the Commons, representing interests which were in .conflict, were not con-
tent to remain mere bystanders in the political order. In America it was 
easy enough to coinmute the House of Commons into a House of Repre-
sentatives. But a House of Lords, with all the pomp and circumstance it 
entailed, was quite out of place in a republic; the aristocratic had to give 
way to a more republican appearance. It had come about-a creative 
touch badly needed in late eighteenth century America-that the city 
state of old, particularly Athens and Rome, had been endowed with a 
prestige which they never as living republics deserveq. Note, for example, 
the host of Greek and Roman place names which :fill the map. Rome was 
a Republic-at least the Rome the Fathers venerated. Rome had a Senate, 
a body made up of the good and wise and not, to the Fathers at least, a 
body of peers. So a Senate, composed of representatives from the states 
which had but recently acquired more or less of sovereignty and elected 
for the limited period of six years by the legislatures thereof, transformed 
the ancient hereditary and ecclesiastical estates into an American Upper 
House. Here, too, the creative work was not gigantic; the pioneering had 
already been largely done by the colonial assemblies recently become state 
legislatures. Here too the materials for the work were at hand but the 
choices which had to be made were not inevitable and, above all, it was 
fortunate that men were at hand blessed with the gift of creative author-
ship. 
The events in England and America from the early seventeenth to the 
late eighteenth century had made the government the instrument of the 
state. The days of the Stuarts were still fresh in the minds of the Fathers. 
In the Declaration of Independence the bill of particulars which makes up 
the eloquent middle section is cast in the form of the unlawful acts of His 
Majesty George III. For that reason, so far as there could be any suprem-
acy in the system of checks and balances set up it lay in the legislature. It 
has been remarked that the power conferred by the People of the United 
States upon the Congress is so concise that it could be written upon a 
postcard. In the light of his general thesis that a national government was 
being set up, fitted out with all the necessary powers to govern, Crosskey 
is bothered as to why it was deemed necessary to enumerate these powers. 
In respect to different powers Crosskey gives different, and usually per-
suasive, reasons. As regards the majority of the powers, his argument is 
that the Congress is being endowed with powers which under the British 
Constitution belonged to the Crown. In fact, there had, especially in the 
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period of 1688 to 1787, been a shift-always startling, often notorious-
from the Crown to the King's Council to the Parliament, so in terms of 
downright fact it is the British Constitution which is being copied. In 
form, however, the power to legislate remained still with the Crown and 
measures of Parliament were still cast as recommendations awaiting the 
pleasure of His Majesty. Even if, in fact, the King had no alternative but 
to sign, the fiction of the royal freedom of choice was still preserved. Al-
though he is not in accord with orthodox scholarship, Crosskey seems to 
me quite right in his insistence that the powers conferred upon the Con-
gress are plenary, not partial or limited or contingent. The case for each 
is strengthened by the list as a whole. Section 8 of Art~cle I is a catalogue 
of the powers which were deemed essential to the practice of political 
economy-that is, to the making and execution of public policy-by men 
of the late eighteenth century. Without such an arsenal the new state 
which was taking its position among the nations of the earth could not 
operate. These were the powers which the operation of a mercantile econ-
omy demanded; and the Fathers of the Constitution, true to the thought 
of their own times, were mercantilists. 
It seems unnecessary to go on. Line after line, clause after clause, has 
its origin in some memorable event and proclaims continuity with the 
past. If the occasion is new, if much expediency is called for, if there has 
to be compromise between the interests which make up the common-
wealth, nevertheless the material which had to be adapted, shaped to new 
ends, fitted to an inchoate yet continental republic was at hand. The really 
creative work of the Convention has been recited and appraised time and 
again. It has, however, not been fully appreciated that the Constitution 
of the United States had been in the making long before the gentlemen of 
substance and standing-called the Fathers in spite of their average age 
of forty-three-met at Philadelphia. What they tried to do was to catch 
up the usages which experience had approved, add to them essential po-
litical inventions of their own, impart a flexibility to elements from many 
sources, and contrive an instrument which would serve as a general guide 
to the new republic for the venture ahead. 
III 
It is a challenging adventure-that of committing a Constitution to 
parchment-but from it there was for the Fathers no escape. So long as 
kings ruled by divine right there had been no need to put the conditions 
of their tenure in writing, for the right was as absolute as the divinity from 
which it sprang and to give it definition or to appoint its limits was to deny 
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its existence. But as the king's pleasure came to be confined to an appoint-
ed orbit and as its exercise was channeled into approved ways, it had to 
be supplied with a new source. There was hesitation, stumbling, tentative 
statement; and at length came the felicitous concept of "the consent of the 
governed." With the rise of the doctrine of "the social contract," the 
dominant analogue of political power ceased to be real property and be-
came contract. The people contracted between themselves as an organized 
community and themselves as an aggregation of individuals to accept 
"law and order'' and to establish a government shaped to their own 
requirements. 
A power which is absolute needs no certificate of authority. A govern-
ment which is not despotic is constantly called upon to justify its exercise 
of power. A social compact may in time become manifest in a system of 
usages which, even if not immune to time, can maintain a high degree of 
stability. But the necessity for the American Revolution had demon-
strated how easily misunderstandings might arise between the government 
and the governed and showed the wisdom of putting it down in writing. 
In England at the time the use of written documents, at least as evidence, 
was in vogue. In the New World came the bold idea of engraving the 
whole social compact on parchment, and as· colony after colony put on the 
trappings of statehood it took a fling at turning a royal charter or some 
like instrument into a constitution. The age of contract demanded that 
the arrangements which constitute a government which is to be an instru-
ment of public policy be put in writing. 
It was, of course, an impossible task. TI?-e technique of the scribe had 
to be invoked for a task which lay beyond its utmost competence. The 
expediencies which are rooted in experience are living things, tangled into 
the whole texture of a culture; yet, when captured and imprisoned in a 
document, they had to be represented by words, phrases, and clauses. Ex-
perience moves on one plane and literary expression on another. And, al-
though the one is substance and the other vehicle, an accommodation be-
tween them which is as practical as it is exact has never been contrived. 
In fact, it is among the most parlous of all adventures to entrust a series 
of living mandates to an inert document. The commands, undertakings, 
arrangements-the social contract if you will-must of necessity take the 
form of brief statement. The words in which they are cast are general and 
even abstract. The reasons which brought the series of mandates into be-
ing-reasons in which inhere their power to compel-are stripped away 
in the writing. These reasons are often inseparable from long chains of 
events-struggles or crusades which have occupied decades or even cen-
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turies and which have been dramatized in concrete happenings that have 
left an impress upon men's souls. What is vivid and real and obvious to 
the Fathers-because they have personally shared in all which lies back 
of a phrase or a clause-reaches posterity only in the form of words. And 
even if the past is not neglected the hearsay of history is no substitute for 
a personal role in stirring events. 
As the Fathers were men of their own age, whose spirits responded to 
and whose minds. could not-transcend the culture within which their lives 
were cast, so were the Sons, the experienced interpreters. It was not the 
writing and all which lay back of it, but rather what was read in it by 
more or less alien eyes, which came to signify. As the Fathers made words 
mean what they wanted them to mean, so the Sons read them, in the same 
spirit and to a different effect. The struggle in England to abate the royal 
prerogatives, with which the minds of the Revolutionary Fathers were 
filled, receded. Even the Revolution itself lost its position as a contempo-
rary event and nationalism and unity, which had been so important, less-
ened-even if they did not lose-their persuasive power. Just as Otis and 
Hancock and Samuel Adams could not quite become Pym and Milton and 
Hampden, however ardently they cast themselves in those roles, so Mar-
shall and his brethren, close as they were to the events at Philadelphia, 
could not quite become Constitutional Fathers. Crosskey is, I think, a 
little severe on James Madison because his views changed with the chang-
ing political scene. It seems inappropriate to regard him as a graphic illus-
tration of what the mind of man will inevitably do with words engraved 
on parchment. If Madison, who had not only been there but was present 
among the actors, could fall into--or even joyously embrace-error, what 
of the jurists, great and little, of posterity, who were shaped by different 
environments, matured their views on alien experiences, and assumed-
because any other course would be laborious, painful, and almost impos-
sible-that the authors of the Constitution were men of sense and reason 
such as themselves? 
Such a temptation to departure from pristine meaning is present in 
even the most static society. In a society such as ours, where the dynamic 
impulse has always been dominant, change constantly calls for adaptation 
-if only to preserve the old values. Situation after situation is presented 
to the courts which the Fathers never confronted and hence could not have 
anticipated. It is sheer speculation to state what they would have done-
and what the Constitution commands-under such alien circumstances. 
The Constitution is treated as a sanction and causes of law are to be re-
solved in its name. Where there is no explicit language to guide, meanings 
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which are relevant must be found in the most responsive lines. Here the 
intent of those who drew the instrument must do duty as best it can for 
words which are not there. And where the instant case-as, for example, 
in radio broadcasting, oil depletion, or air carriage-presents problems 
which people of the late eighteenth century never contemplated, there is 
still at hand a frame of constitutional reference. For the word "manifest" 
can be placed before the word "intent"; and the judiciary may talk 
learnedly about "manifest intent," that is, what the Fathers would have 
intended had they been confronted with the circumstances of the instant 
case. And no one can prove that in such speculation the courts are beyond 
any peradventure wrong. No document can preserve its original integrity 
when beat upon by such hammers as the march of time has at its com-
mand. Usage, the creation of a changing culture, has a way of impressing 
itself upon the lines of any document which serves to carry down the gen-
erations a legacy of command. The quarrel which Crosskey has with the 
interpreters is not, I suspect, because of departures from what was really 
written in the original text. It rests, rather, I take it, upon two grounds-
that the departures have been made in an unintelligent way and that they 
·have moved in the wrong direction. It is an axiom of judicial interpreta-
tion that one who departs from the accepted text should understand what 
he is forsaking and that he should have good and sufficient reasons for the 
new script. In general, this has not been true of the exposition of constitu-
tional doctrine. Too often strange tenets, the handiwork of advocates for 
special interests, have won the adherence of the Supreme Court. For illus-
tration, one has only to note the multifarious ways-running from states 
rights through interstate commerce to the delegation of power-in which 
the courts have read a theory of laissez faire utterly unknown to the 
Fathers into dominant clauses of the Constitution. The expounders did not 
know-in cases, they did not care to know-what the Founders of the 
Republic had in mind. So far as ignorance goes, it can no longer be an 
excuse; for Crosskey has established the great majority of his theses be-
yond peradventure and has created an all but impossible task for all who 
will challenge them. 
More important is the fact that many of the departures have been in 
the wrong direction. They represent an attempt, from which the courts 
have not been completely immune, to turn back the clock. As decade has 
followed decade, an aggregation of petty agrarian economies with a fringe 
of industry has been converted into a unified and highly diversified eco-
nomic entity continental in reach. With this march, one would expect the 
power of the Congress over commerce among the several states to be little 
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by little enlarged until, with the move into the twentieth century, it be-
came plenary, as a truly national economy demands. Instead, the concept 
of the Fathers better fits the circumstances of today than does that of the 
jurists who have covered up the original text of "commerce among the 
several states" with the corroding gloss of "interstate commerce." So cor-
rupting has been the exegesis that even today courts dare to undo the 
harm only in a piecemeal fashion. Had the Fathers been permitted to have 
their way, we would long ago have had a truly national code of commercial 
law and there would be none of the confusion which a multitude of sov-
ereignties with power to command has brought into our economic life. 
And had the mandates of the Judiciary Article and the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause been preserved, they would have gone far to :fit out the na-
tion with a simple, uniform, and definitive code of law. Above all, Cross-
key has fought valiantly in his crusade against the trend -not yet entirely 
out of fashion-of looking upon and interpreting the Constitution as an 
aggregation of fragments. It is a unified document and each clause must 
be read in its context. It is high time for the Preamble to be restored to 
its place as an integral part of the document; it states the objectives of 
national government and the political structure which !s dedicated there-
to, and the powers ~th which its several branches are endowed have sig-
nificance only in terms of the ends of public policy they are intended to 
serve. 
These two volumes will draw forth sharp criticism and bitter disagree-
ment. The work would have far less significance if it did not do so. Critics 
are as other men; and, even as and like other embroiderers on ancient 
texts, are not fully aware of the ultimate sources of their judgments. 
Something other than Crosskey's paragraphs will get into the thing which 
is appraised. Certainly his boldness, justified as it is by the documents, 
will not appeal to timid souls who are shocked by all novelty. The mono-
graph boys and the pedants who conceive of scholarship as an excursion in 
myopia will loudly voice disapproval. Then there are those who have, by 
the heroic use of the pen, created for themselves vested interest in estab-
lished articles of constitutional faith. To them acceptance of the Crosskey 
thesis will be anathema. In particular, all those who expect dividends of 
prestige from established scholarship will entrench themselves behind 
their publications and defend their frontiers to the last footnote. 
It is, I think, my differences with Crosskey which make me so conscious 
of how superb his contribution is. He makes the Constitution more of an 
entity than I can, less of a document through which the whole stream of 
history :flows. To Crosskey its mandate is more self-contained, more com-
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pelling, more enduring than to me. We agree, I think, in admitting the 
flexibility of at least many of its provisions. We differ in that the correct-
ing-or, if you will, the corroding-impact of time seems to me far more 
inevitable than to him. And, above all, I am far more prone than he to 
merge the parchment of 1787 into a stream of usage in which its identity 
is hard to discover, if not entirely lost. In a word, he puts more faith in the 
capacity of the writing in itself to maintain law and order than I can com-
mand. And I return from his pages with my skepticism renewed that 
there is no such question as to whether we possess a written or an un-
written constitution. 
Never has so adequate a gloss-fashioned from materials from a hun-
dred sources-been written to an authoritative text. It is for this reason 
that Crosskey's volumes are timely-that is, they are for all time. 
